In the proof-theoretic study of logic, the notion of normal proof has been understood and investigated as a metalogical property. Usually we formulate a system of logic, identify a class of proofs as normal proofs, and show that every proof in the system reduces to a corresponding normal proof. This paper develops a system of modal logic that is capable of expressing the notion of normal proof within the system itself, thereby making normal proofs an inherent property of the logic. Using a modality to express the existence of a normal proof, the system provides a means for both recognizing and manipulating its own normal proofs. We develop the system as a sequent calculus with the implication connective ⊃ and the modality , and prove the cut elimination theorem. From the sequent calculus, we derive two equivalent natural deduction systems.
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Introduction
In the proof-theoretic study of logic, the notion of normal proof has played a central role. Conceptually a normal proof is a proof that contains no indirect reasoning and provides direct evidence of the truth it asserts. In a formal system of logic, a normal proof is a proof that contains no "detour" which introduces a connective or modality (e.g., implication ⊃, conjunction ∧, and necessity ) only to immediately eliminate it. In this sense, a normal proof is minimal in size because it does not reduce to another proof (irrespective of the size of its representation).
Traditionally the notion of normal proof has been understood and investigated as a metalogical property. Usually we formulate a system of logic, identify a class of proofs as normal proofs, and show that every proof in the system reduces to a corresponding (unique) normal proof. The result is then exploited in examining other metalogical properties of the system such as unprovability of inconsistency (⊥) and solving practical problems such as building a theorem prover. Thus, although not recognized by the system itself, normal proofs serve as an indispensable tool for succinctly characterizing the system and developing practical applications.
This paper develops a system of logic that is capable of expressing the notion of normal proof within the system itself. That is, the system has a means for internalizing and reasoning about its own normal proofs, thereby making normal proofs an inherent property of the logic (as opposed to a metalogical property). Thus the system is reflective [1] in that it is self-aware of its own normal proofs. To the best of our knowledge, no such system has been proposed.
We formulate the logic in the judgmental style of Martin-Löf [2, 3] which distinguishes between judgments and propositions. A judgment represents an object of knowledge and a proof of it allows us to know the object of knowledge. If we do not have a proof, the judgment is not part of our knowledge. In contrast, a proposition conveys no knowledge in itself, but if A is known to be a proposition, we know what counts as a verification of its truth. That is, we can check whether a proof of the truth of A is indeed valid or not. Thus the notion of judgment is independent of (and precedes in priority) the notion of proposition.
In order to deal with both ordinary proofs and normal proofs within the same system of logic, we use two separate judgments A true and A ↑ where A is a proposition, or simply a formula. A true is a truth judgment whose proof is an ordinary proof and may reduce to another proof. A ↑, adopted from the intercalation calculus of Byrnes [4] , is a normality judgment whose proof is a normal proof and does not reduce to another proof. As A ↑ states a different "mode" of truth, namely truth with a normal proof, we develop the system as "modal" logic [5] by defining a new modality to capture the metalogical property of A true expressed in A ↑. As shown by Pfenning and Davies [3] , the judgmental style lends itself particularly well to the development of systems of modal logic. In our case, we use to internalize a normality judgment within a truth judgment 1 :
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A technical challenge is to deal with the chicken-and-egg nature of the problem. The rule I internalizes A ↑ within A true and thus expands the set of truth judgments. At the same time, it also expands the set of normality judgments because the existence of A true implies the existence of a corresponding normality judgment A ↑. Now the rule I allows us to deduce another truth judgment A true, which introduces yet another normality judgment A ↑, and so on. As is the case in similar reflective systems [6, 7, 1] , the problem is quite subtle, especially because we wish to develop a simple system using a single modality instead of an infinite tower of modalities (e.g.,
, . . .). We develop a sequent calculus with the implication connective ⊃ and the modality , and prove the cut elimination theorem. Then we derive two natural deduction system equivalent to the sequent calculus (one for deducing normality judgments and another for deducing truth judgments). Our finding is that in order for the system to be useful and interesting, should be used to internalize not a normality judgment in the standard sense, but a weaker form of normality judgment whose proof may use hypotheses of normality judgments.
From a philosophical point of view, our system is superficially similar to provability logic [8] in that it is concerned with provability of judgments and is also reflective. Its real nature is different, however, because the modality expresses not the general notion of provability but only the existence of a special form of proof, namely a weaker form of normality judgment. For example, ( A ⊃ A) true is provable in our system, but not in provability logic if is used as the provability modality. (In provability logic, ( ( A ⊃ A)) ⊃ A true is given as an axiom.)
is also different from the necessity modality in modal logic: is concerned with proofs valid in every context, which are not necessarily normal. For example,
true is not provable in our system whereas (A ⊃ B) ⊃ ( A ⊃ B) true is provable in modal logic like S4. While it is interesting mainly from a theoretical point of view, our system has indeed been inspired by a practical type system for parallel functional languages [9] . The type system uses a modality to indicate whether the result of evaluating a given term contains mutable references or not. As a term always evaluates to a value, the type system is inherently capable of recognizing values, which are a special class of irreducible terms. By applying the Curry-Howard isomorphism, we obtain a system of logic recognizing a special class of proofs that can be represented by values. Our system attempts to further generalize the correspondence by using the modality to recognize fully normal proofs. Thus it may serve as a proof-theoretic foundation for type systems that distinguish between different classes of terms belonging to the same type.
We begin in Section 2 by introducing the problem of internalizing normality judgments with the modality .
Modality for internalizing normal proofs
This section specifies our goal and explains technical difficulties in detail. Because of the peculiarity of internalizing normality judgments with the new modality , we need to introduce some new concepts not found in the conventional proof-theoretic study of logic. We consider a fragment of propositional logic with the implication connective ⊃ only, since all interesting challenges arise from the interaction between and ⊃. 1 To internalize a judgment J means to represent the knowledge expressed in J with a truth judgment using a specific connective or modality. For example, we internalize a hypothetical judgment A true . . .
B true
within a truth judgment A ⊃ B true using the implication connective ⊃. In modal logic, we internalize within a truth judgment A true a truth judgment A true that is valid in every context.
Goal
Consider the following natural deduction system N true :
A true 
B true
Prawitz [10] refers to the sequence of formulae in a detour as a maximal segment and defines a normal proof as a proof with no maximal segment. Instead of characterizing normal proofs in terms of absence of detours or maximal segments, we adopt the intercalation calculus of Byrnes [4] which can be thought of as using a new form of judgment to directly define normal proofs.
In addition to truth judgments, our system uses two new basic judgments: normality judgments and neutrality judgments.
We use a normality judgment A ↑ for a normal proof of A true. The intuition is that a proof of A ↑ requires a bottom-up application of an introduction rule (such as ⊃I). We use a neutrality judgment A ↓ for a neutral proof of A true. A neutral proof is either a hypothesis or obtained as a top-down application of an elimination rule (such as ⊃E) to another neutral proof. When A ↓ and A ↑ meet in the middle, we complete a normal proof. Thus a proof of a normality judgment C ↑ has the following structure (which clearly shows that a normal proof contains no detour):
The following natural deduction system N ↑↓ gives the inference rules for normality and neutrality judgments:
Note that A ↓ is strictly stronger than A ↑ because of the rule ↓↑.
2 For the fragment of propositional logic with ⊃ only, this definition of normal proof is accurate. For full propositional logic, this definition needs to be extended. 3 We write
The rules in N ↑↓ may be thought of as specifying a special strategy in the search of proofs of truth judgments in N true , since a proof of A ↑ can be converted to a proof of A true by replacing all normality and neutrality judgments in it with truth judgments. Hence A ↑ is stronger than A true. The normalization theorem [10] The rule I internalizes a normality judgment A ↑ within a truth judgment using the modality . The rule E enables us to extract the normality judgment A ↑ internalized into a truth judgment A true. Note that like a hypothesis A true of a truth judgment, a hypothesis A ↑ of a normality judgment can be interpreted literally. That is, it just assumes a proof of a normality judgment A ↑.
The two rules I and E satisfy local soundness and completeness in the following sense [3] :
• An introduction followed by an elimination can be reduced.
• A proof of A true can be expanded into another proof of A true via an elimination by the rule E.
Now that we have inference rules for truth judgments A true, we also need corresponding inference rules for normality and neutrality judgments:
The rule I ↑ , derived from the rule I, explains how to build a new proof of A ↑. The rule E ↓ , derived from the rule E, explains how to exploit an existing proof of A ↓. Without these rules, the system does not fully capture the notion of normal proof because not every formula A is allowed in A true (e.g., A = A ).
We write N true for the natural deduction system consisting of all the inference rules given above; we also write N ↑↓ for the natural deduction system consisting of N ↑↓ , I ↑ , and E ↓ , which deals only with normality and neutrality judgments:
Our goal is to make N true equivalent to N ↑↓ , revising both systems as necessary, in the same way that N true is equivalent to N ↑↓ : 
The problem with N true consists in the rule I ↑ : not every normality judgment A ↑ is eligible as the premise of the rule I ↑ , which, however, places no restriction on its premise. To see why, think of the rule I as opening up an "inner region" starting from its premise A ↑ within an "outer region" ending with its conclusion A true
The two regions are separate from each other because the inner region proves a normality judgment whereas the outer region consists only of truth judgments. Since the rule I ↑ refines the rule I, its premise cannot reside in the same region as its conclusion. The rule I ↑ in its current form, however, fails to specify that its premise and conclusion reside in separate regions. In the example above, the hypothesis A ↓ u resides in the same region as the conclusion of the rule I ↑ , which implies that the premise of the rule I ↑ also resides in the same region.
Thus we can imagine that there is an infinite stack of regions and that every judgment in a valid proof resides in a certain unique region, i.e., no conflict arises in assigning a region to each judgment. The region where a judgment resides is determined as follows:
• A hypothesis introduced by the rule ⊃I or ⊃I ↑ resides in the same region as the conclusion.
• The premise of the rule I or I ↑ resides in the next inner region.
• A hypothesis introduced by the rule E or E ↓ resides in the next inner region.
Then, for example, an attempt to prove A ⊃ A ↑ ends up with a conflict in assigning a region to the judgment A ↑: Thus the challenge now is to reformulate N true so that it properly accounts for the relationship between judgments residing in different regions and also clearly distinguishes between normal proofs in the standard sense and normal proofs subject to substitutions. In order to permit judgments residing in different regions, N true uses two separate contexts in its hypothetical judgments; in order to permit normal proofs subject to substitutions, N true introduces a weaker form of normality judgments called semi-normality judgments.
For technical reasons, we set out to develop a sequent calculus S (Section 3), which, in comparison with a natural deduction system, lends itself better to checking the soundness (or consistency) of the system. It is customary to start with a natural deduction system and then derive a sequent calculus. When designing a new system whose soundness is unclear, however, it is better to consider a sequent calculus before developing a natural deduction system because we need a sequent calculus anyway in order to check its soundness. A cut elimination theorem proves that the system is indeed sound (Section 4). From the sequent calculus, it is routine to derive corresponding natural deduction systems (N ↑↓ in Section 5
and N true in Section 6).
Sequent calculus S
This section presents a sequent calculus S which augments the sequent calculus for N true with the modality . The main obstacle to developing S is to identify a form of sequent that is finite in size, yet expressive enough to allow for a stack of regions of arbitrary depth. Hence we interpret every sequent relative to a certain hypothetical region, which we refer to as a reference region.
Let us begin with a sequent Γ −→ C for the sequent calculus for N true . A in Γ is interpreted as A ↓ and C as C ↑, both in the reference region. Consider a sequent Γ, A −→ C . Analyzing A ↓ creates A ↑ in the next inner region (as in the rule E ↓ ), which does not fit into the present form of sequent. Hence we expand the left side of the sequent with a new context Ψ such that A in Ψ is interpreted as a hypothesis of A ↑ belonging to the next inner region. For example, the following rule now makes sense:
The new form of sequent justifies the following rule:
The rule Init (for proving Initial sequents), which corresponds to the rule ↓↑ in N ↑↓ , converts a neutrality judgment A ↓ into a normality judgment A ↑, both in the reference region. It requires A to be an atomic formula, although the requirement can be lifted (see Proposition 3.1). Now we need a rule that uses hypotheses of normality judgments in Ψ . In designing such a rule, we should distinguish between those proofs that do not use hypotheses in Ψ and thus yield a normality judgment in the standard sense, and those proofs that use hypotheses in Ψ and thus yield a weaker judgment. Without such a distinction, cut elimination would fail because a proof of Ψ ; Γ −→ C that uses hypotheses in Ψ may not reveal the structure of a complete proof of C ↑, which is essential to guarantee cut elimination. Thus we are led to use two forms of sequents defined as follows:
• Ψ ; Γ −→ C proves a normality judgment C ↑ in the standard sense. A cut elimination theorem (Theorem 4.1) is to be established for sequents of this form.
• Ψ ; Γ ⇒ C proves a weaker judgment, namely a semi-normality judgment C ⇑, whose proof may use hypotheses in Ψ .
A substitution theorem (Theorem 4.2) is to be established for sequents of this form.
In both forms of sequents, A in Ψ is interpreted as a hypothesis of a semi-normality judgment A ⇑ belonging to the next inner region. In order to use hypotheses in Ψ , we introduce the following rule Sub (for Substituting semi-normality judgments) which moves a semi-normality judgment A ⇑ from the next inner region to the reference region:
We use the modality to internalize not a normality judgment but a semi-normality judgment in the next inner region. Using to internalize a normality judgment is okay, but it renders the system useless because no elimination rule for is allowed. In fact, adding an elimination rule for eventually forces us to use to internalize a semi-normality judgment. Thus, for example, the natural deduction system derived from S has the following introduction rule:
An important decision in the design of S is to interpret A in a context Ψ as a hypothesis of A ⇑ belonging to not only the next inner region but also all further inner regions. That is, once a hypothesis of A ⇑ is added to the next inner region, it is copied to all further inner regions as well, effectively coalescing all inner regions. The rationale is that we wish to design S as a reflective system that is aware of its own rule A ⇑ A ↑ I↑ , or equivalently, that is aware that A ↑ is provable whenever a proof of A ⇑ exists. The new interpretation of Ψ manifests itself as a proof of A ⊃ A ↑ to be shown later.
A atomic Because of the decision to coalesce all inner regions, S needs only a single modality rather than an infinite tower of • A in Ψ denotes a hypothesis of A ⇑ belonging to all inner regions.
• A in Γ denotes a neutrality judgment A ↓ belonging to the reference region.
• Ψ ; Γ −→ C proves C ↑ in the reference region.
• Ψ ; Γ ⇒ C proves C ⇑ in the reference region. Fig. 1 shows the rules in S . We implicitly identify contexts up to structural equivalence (exchange and contraction). Weakening is also built into the rules Init, Init , and Sub. The requirement on the rule Init that A be an atomic formula ensures that any proof of Ψ ; Γ −→ C eventually decomposes C into its atomic subformulae. A similar requirement is placed on the rule Init , but the rule Sub allows us to prove Ψ ; Γ ⇒ C without analyzing C . The rules L and L analyze A ↓ in the reference region and place a hypothesis of A ⇑ in all inner regions. The rules R and R express that a proof of A ↑ or A ⇑ requires a proof of A ⇑ in the next inner region where Ψ continues to be valid (because it contains hypotheses belonging to all inner regions) but Γ from the reference region is no longer valid. The first premise of the rule ⊃L proves A ↑ instead of A ⇑, which implies that an analysis of A ⊃ B ↓ must be accompanied by a proof of A ↑. S satisfies the subformula property and can be shown to be decidable.
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 show that A in the rules Init and Init can be any formula. The results serve as evidence of the completeness of S in the sense that the left rules (such as L and ⊃L) are strong enough to guarantee the provability of C ↑ and C ⇑ using the right rules (such as R and ⊃R) after decomposing C into its atomic subformulae. Proposition 3.3 shows that Ψ ; Γ −→ C is stronger than Ψ ; Γ ⇒ C .
Proposition 3.1. ·; A −→ A is derivable for any formula A.
Proof. By induction on the structure of A. We show two interesting cases. ??? 
Cut elimination in S
This section proves cut elimination in S which serves as evidence of its soundness. As S uses two disjoint contexts in a sequent, we consider two different forms of cut elimination. As usual, the main cut elimination theorem analyzes a proof of A ↑ to remove a neutrality judgment A ↓: 
Note that Ψ ; · ⇒ A can be thought of as proving A ⇑ in the next inner region because it uses no neutrality judgment and every hypothesis contained in Ψ is assumed to be valid in all inner regions.
We first prove Theorem 4.2 which is used in the proof of Theorem 4.1. • A in Ψ is interpreted as a hypothesis of A ⇑ belonging to the next inner region. As in S , we assume that it is copied to all further inner regions as well.
• A in Γ is interpreted as a hypothesis of A ↓ belonging to the reference region.
• J is a semi-normality judgment C ⇑, a neutrality judgment C ↓, or a normality judgment C ↑, all belonging to the reference region. respectively. An introduction rule (e.g., I ↑ ) corresponds to a right rule (e.g., R) and an elimination rule (e.g., E ↓ ) to left rules (e.g., L and L ). Fig. 3 . Rules new to the natural deduction system N true .
Lemma 5.3. 
Natural deduction system N true
This section presents a natural deduction system N true which is equivalent to N ↑↓ , but allows us to deduce truth judgments. Deriving N true from N ↑↓ is analogous to deriving N true from N ↑↓ , but more involved because truth judgments coexist with normality judgments and semi-normality judgments in N true whereas only truth judgments exist in N true .
As it is concerned with deducing truth judgments, N true needs another hypothetical judgment of the form Ψ ; Γ C true.
As in N
↑↓ , we interpret A in Ψ as a hypothesis of A ⇑ belonging to the next inner region. A in Γ , however, is interpreted as a hypothesis of A true instead of a (stronger) hypothesis of A ↓. Hence the meaning of Γ in Ψ ; Γ J now depends on whether J is a truth judgment or not.
• A in Ψ is interpreted as a hypothesis of A ⇑ belonging to the next inner region as well as all further inner regions.
• For J = C true, we interpret A in Γ as a hypothesis of A true belonging to the reference region.
• For J = C ⇑, C ↓, or C ↑, we interpret A in Γ as a hypothesis of A ↓ belonging to the reference region.
• J may be any judgment and belongs to the reference region.
We obtain N true from the rules in N ↑↓ by rewriting both A ↑ and A ↓ as A true, thereby collapsing the distinction between A ↑ and A ↓. 
which does not make sense because Γ in the premise, which denotes hypotheses of truth judgments, is incompatible with Γ in the conclusion, which denotes hypotheses of neutrality judgments. Since no rule in Fig. 3 deduces a normality or semi-normality judgment while N true subsumes N ↑↓ as a subsystem, 
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the structure of the proof of Ψ ; Γ C ↑ and Ψ ; Γ C ↓. 2 We can also explain the relationship between truth judgments and semi-normality judgments. Intuitively a proof of We close this section by summarizing properties of N true in an axiomatic style:
• ( A ⊃ A) true is provable (U).
• A ⊃ A true is provable (4).
•
• A ⊃ A true is not provable (T).
• If A true is provable, then A true is provable.
• If A ⊃ A true is provable, then A true is provable.
The last two statements are metalogical properties of N true , which we prove in Propositions 6.4 and 6.5. 
Here we assume that the rule L is not applied again in E to decompose A. Note that E must contain only applications of the rules L, ⊃L, and ⊃R, and no application of the rule R, in the presence of which we cannot apply the rule L or L to decompose A. Because of the subformula property of the sequent calculus S , all formulae in Ψ , Ψ , Γ , and Γ as well as the formula C are subformulae of A. (We have Ψ ⊆ Ψ , but Γ is not necessarily a subset of Γ .)
Now observe that no right rule ( R, R , ⊃R, and ⊃R ) appears in E because C is a subformula of A. Therefore E may apply only the rules L and ⊃L , which contradicts the assumption that it terminates with a sequent of the form Ψ ; Γ −→ C (where Ψ = Ψ, A and Γ = A, Γ ). Hence A in ·; A −→ A is unnecessary in the proof of D and there exists a proof of ·; · −→ A. 2
Conclusion
We present a system of modal logic that extends a fragment of propositional logic with the implication connective ⊃ and uses a novel modality to express the notion of normal proof within the system itself. A sequent calculus is developed to ensure that the system is sound, and then equivalent natural deduction systems are derived. The main obstacle to developing the system is to identify a form of sequent that reflects the self-referential nature of truth judgments and normality judgments. We find that only semi-normality judgments, which are a weaker form of normality judgments, can be internalized within truth judgments using .
Future work includes extending our system to full propositional logic and first-order logic, which do not require additional forms of sequents or hypothetical judgments. As the present work uses a purely proof-theoretic approach, a modeltheoretic account of the modality is another direction to pursue.
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